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Types of Statements on Emotion in Music
Benjamin Krämer
a bstr act  The question of emotion in music is addressed from a linguistic 
perspective, providing a typology of statements that can be made about that 
topic. In particular, it is analyzed how an interlocutor could react to such 
statements uttered by another person, and whether or how the content of 
the statements could be refuted by the listener, and possibly corroborated by 
the speaker. Furthermore, it is briefly discussed which theories of emotion 
in music are compatible with the respective types of statement and what il­
locutionary and perlocutionary function they may serve.
k ey wor ds  Emotion, music, linguistic analysis, typology
Music has often been said to be the language of emotion,1 but what does 
language have to say about emotion in music? Of course, the question 
of emotion in music has been treated extensively. However, I think that 
further clarification is possible on some points through the examination 
of statements on this very topic, i.e., statements on the relationship be-
tween music and emotions that could occur in everyday conversation or 
academic discourses. The relevance of this analysis is at least twofold. 
Firstly, it may be of intrinsic interest what people say about emotion in 
music: how can we express our experiences or judgments and convey 
them to others? Secondly, this analysis may complement a phenomeno-
logical and empirical perspective by approaching emotion in music via 
the indirect linguistic route. This does not mean that we should uncriti-
cally take any linguistic form to be a valid indicator of a phenomenon 
under analysis or an experience. However, by drawing on a typology of 
possible (and ‘impossible’) statements, one may use the different types 
of utterances to guide an introspective or empirical analysis of the ex-
perience represented by the linguistic forms: if a statement of a certain 
type can be made, what does it refer to, how can we grasp the essential 
properties of the phenomenon and its differentia specifica? Why can we 
make such statements and not others (that are nonsensical)? Conversely, 
a type of statement may be found to misguide a phenomenological or 
empirical analysis or to be at odds with a sound description of experi-
ences or empirical facts. As a preliminary to an analysis along this route, 
I will discuss which types of statements and reactions are compatible 
with what kind of theory on emotion in music. A scholar can both put 
forth his or her own theory, and analyze which theories may be explicitly 
held or to which theories a speaker may be implicitly committed (as a 
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precondition, a consequence, a corollary, and so forth) when making a 
statement on emotion and music. These are two different tasks, and I will 
switch between brief remarks of both kinds, according to what seems 
more interesting, appropriate and fruitful. My main interest, however, 
rests with the typology of statements.
The main questions of this essay can be posed thus: What, in general, 
may be said on (particular) emotions in (particular) music, i.e., what types 
of statements exist? What do such statements mean and imply? What are 
the criteria of their validity and their purpose? In particular, the analysis 
of these criteria and of the commitments implied in the statements is 
possible by noting how an interlocutor could react to statements uttered 
by another person, and whether and how the content of the statements 
could be refuted by the listener (as unjustified or nonsense), and possibly 
corroborated by the speaker.
I believe that each type of statement presented below cannot be re-
duced to another type, except if quite particular bridging theses are held. 
The typology is deduced from the simple distinction between the lis-
tener, the piece of music, and the artist or composer2 as the main point 
of reference of the statement: One may utter statements about the sub-
jective impression of the listener as to the emotional appearance of the 
piece, the music referring symbolically to some emotion, and the artist’s 
intention or the music as an indicator of his or her condition. This ‘attri-
bution’ of emotion to different entities related to music is an essential 
aspect of a speaker’s theory of emotion in music and therefore a typo-
logical criterion that is (certainly among others) suited for the analysis of 
statements. However, this does not mean that the types of statements are 
mutually exclusive or that they may be unequivocally mapped to distinct 
theories. They are simply more plausible in one theoretical framework 
than in another.
I
The first category of statements consists in what I shall term statements 
about impressions or appearance. It is exemplified by utterances such 
as, ‘This piece of music sounds sad (to me)’, or ‘(In my view) this music 
is/seems/appears (to be) sad’. The point of these statements is not to de-
scribe which emotions are caused by music, although the speaker may 
hold the theory that this amounts to the same thing: if music is or sounds 
sad, it makes people sad.3 This type of statement on effects I will only 
consider very briefly. It has been argued that listening to music can cause 
different emotions than those that are expressed or recognized in it; e.g., 
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one can express delight that a work conveys an exemplary impression 
of a melancholic atmosphere; or it may not cause any emotion at all, as 
in the case of a completely analytic mode of listening.4 Conversely, I do 
not think that the main reason for calling a piece of music sad is that 
it causes sadness in the listener.5 For the present purpose, I will simply 
refer to the following statement as an illustration: ‘How wonderfully sad 
that music is! It makes me melancholic, and I like that.’ I think that the 
burden of proof is with those who argue that causation and impression 
amount to the same, despite the fact that there are two quite different 
types of statements. Furthermore, they should be able to explain how the 
view that impression and causation amount to the same thing could also 
apply to other phenomena or what accounts for the difference between 
emotions and other phenomena where this is not the case (e.g., consider 
the case of a work of art that is described as ‘cold’).
We shall now consider the possible answers to a statement such as, 
‘This piece of music sounds sad (to me)’. Then imagine a respondent 
saying something such as, ‘No, it doesn’t’. Whether and how this makes 
sense depends on what exactly the second speaker wishes to deny. It 
would not be adequate in most cases to respond by saying only, ‘No, it 
doesn’t’, although there are at least four types of cases where a respon-
dent might wish to reject the original speaker’s statement on his impres-
sion of sadness. These types are as follows: The respondent disagrees 
as to the variety of emotion; the respondent thinks that the speaker is 
insincere; the respondent thinks that reasonable or experienced listeners 
should come to another conclusion; or the respondent thinks the speaker 
has used inadequate language.
1. The respondent may disagree as to the variety of emotion with a 
response such as, ‘No, to me it sounds calm’. How is this possible? First, it 
has to be made clear how one can say of a piece of music that it is sad. Mu-
sic seems to belong to some kind of entity to which we often intuitively 
and naturally apply the word ‘sad’.6 Indeed, we perceive a musical perfor-
mance or a musical work as a distinct entity, as something belonging to-
gether and being separated from other phenomena, with some properties 
that characterize it as a whole, just as some other sound or noise: a shrill 
voice (heard without seeing the speaker, thus in particular perceived as 
a distinct entity), the strepitous creak of a door, and so on.7 If one is try-
ing to listen to music while the neighbor has pumped up the volume of 
his stereo, we discern two entities, i.e., two musical events that can be 
characterized independently. Sometimes we may also wish to character-
ize only a part of a piece, for example, one passage or movement may be 
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perceived as sad and another as joyful; the piano part in Beethoven’s 4th 
piano concerto may be considered tender and imploring, while the uni-
son strings seem grim and threatening.8 The choice of a level at which an 
entity is delimited and described in emotional terms is made implicitly 
or explicitly by the listener.
Having noted that music is perceived as an entity with certain prop-
erties or appearances, and leaving aside the task of defining music (we 
may simply say that listeners apply the word ‘sad’ to something they 
would call music), we may turn to the concept of emotion insofar as it is 
relevant to the emotional character ascribed to music in the present type 
of statement.
Emotions are phenomena that consist in several aspects or compo-
nents, such as subjective feelings, arousal and valence, behavioral ten-
dencies, facial and gestural expressions, cognitive contents and typical 
antecedents, and so forth. Depending on the theory of emotion one holds, 
different aspects are counted as part of the definition of emotion, while 
others are seen as causes, signs and consequences. Notwithstanding this 
possible vagueness of definition, cognitive schemata exist that serve to 
identify emotions even in the absence of the complete range of compo-
nents.9 We could say in Wittgensteinian terms that we have learned 
the word ‘sad’ by being referred to some of these components. We have 
learned it implicitly (How do I know that this piece is sad? – It would be 
an answer to say: ‘I have learned English’10).
Accordingly, something is called sad if it shows one or more of the typi-
cal aspects of sadness (outward signs and antecedents or introspective 
properties – introspection by a sad person, not by the beholder) or some 
appearance that suggests an analogy or similarity to such an aspect: slow 
movements, low arousal, a monotonous and low voice, references to causes 
such as a loss or loneliness, and so forth. This view has been defended 
in ‘contour’ or ‘similarity’ theories of musical expression.11 We say that a 
face or physiognomy (even of an animal which is not sad, such as a Saint 
Bernard) looks sad, that a posture or voice may be called sad. A desert 
landscape may also be said to look sad (the clue or link to the prototype be-
ing emptiness, loneliness or the ‘cold’ light), as may a painting with pale or 
dark colors, static composition, the portrayal of empty spaces, or portray-
ing lonely or sad persons and situations that go along with sadness. We 
also sometimes use expressions indicating that there is sadness in some-
thing (‘There was a lot of sadness in his face’). In the case of music, we may 
say that there is sadness, and that this sadness is in the music.
What components of sadness must be present or represented by anal-
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ogy, similarity, symbolism, or some other means, to cause listeners (with 
their different predispositions) to describe a specific piece of music as 
sad is an empirical rather than an analytical or phenomenological prob-
lem.12 Therefore, I will not speculate on this question, but assume that 
impressions of a piece’s emotional character are phenomenally transpar-
ent – i.e., they are directly given to us (like an object is blue or green); the 
impression’s content is consciously available, but one cannot determine 
introspectively what characterizes it as a mental fact per se (what differ-
ent impressions have in common and what ‘having’ a certain impression 
amounts to), and what causes it.13 Thus, a person can make only specula-
tive statements about the properties of the music that actually lead to 
the impression (in that person herself of himself) of sadness in a certain 
case, while the underlying mechanisms and criteria of this ascription are 
not accessible to introspection. The impression as such is neither subject 
to any doubt by the person (we do not ‘know’ about them, with all the 
qualifications and modalities that are applicable to knowledge, although 
the impression’s content may be that something appears ambiguous to 
us), nor can it be proven or falsified by any external criteria. One has the 
impression and one cannot be mistaken about it, and another person 
does not have any means to argue about the impression itself; that is, the 
second person could not say, ‘No, you are wrong, it does not appear sad to 
you’, or ‘No, your impression only appears to be one of sadness, but in fact 
it is one of joy’. What makes the type of statement considered here true is 
that the person has an identifiable impression and she feels that it is ad-
equately subsumed under what is habitually called ‘sadness’, that she has 
recognized sadness, something known to her, and labeled it correctly.
Still, there are many opportunities for disagreement centered on state-
ments about such an impression, as will be shown subsequently. In this 
case however, if the respondent disagrees as to the variety of emotion, he 
does not refute the original statement (that the speaker has the impres-
sion of sadness). He only rejects it in the sense that it does not reflect his 
own impression: that he disagrees; and he cannot, after consideration of 
or explication by the original speaker, adopt the first speaker’s view or 
even imagine that it can be held (see below for a discussion of the pos-
sibility of such a change of mind).
A precondition for phenomenal transparency in the case of medially 
transmitted experiences (in the broadest sense, including live performan-
ces of music) is the transparency of the medium, i.e., the phenomenon 
that we are familiar with the technical modalities and the formal conven-
tions of a medium to such a degree that we can interpret a representation 
Benjamin Krämer
70
in that medium directly; that some impression or meaning immediately 
and automatically comes to our mind without concentrating on its encod-
ing.14 For example, when reading a text in one’s own native language as 
opposed to one in a foreign writing system, we most often understand 
it in such way that we do not concentrate on the shape of the letters, of-
ten disregard typing errors or even the word choice and style unless we 
deliberately concentrate on it or unless some cue directs our attention 
towards these levels of the medium. Likewise, a westerner (or another 
person sufficiently familiar with western music) often easily recognizes 
some emotion in a pop song or a classical work without considering its 
structural features, whereas it may be difficult or impossible for her to 
identify any emotion in, say, the singing in a piece of Noh drama, even if 
she carefully follows its structure. She might say that this music ‘doesn’t 
tell her anything’ – and, interestingly, that, e.g., if the music seems sad 
to her, this may be only because she is not familiar with the style of the 
piece, which ‘may express something different, or any emotion at all’ 
(see below on statements about expression). The opacity of the medium 
is one possible reason for a case where one person does not have a clear 
emotional impression at all. This probably occurs most often with early, 
atonal or foreign music, but can happen with any work. With regard 
to phenomenal transparency, it has to be noted that an unclear impres-
sion is possible (e.g., doubts about its character or the correct terms to 
state them), but doubts about having an impression or not are excluded. 
It is, e.g., impossible to doubt that one has doubts about the emotion 
one hears. A speaker or respondent can surely use terms that denote un-
certainty about emotion in music, such as: ‘I believe/suppose/guess that 
the music is somehow/probably/maybe sad’, or: ‘You seem to be unsure 
whether this music you described was really sad’. It is hard to find an 
example of a (according to my view, nonsensical) statement where the 
impression as such rather than its content is questioned, as we tend to 
relate any marks of doubt to the content, but it may be considered strange 
to say, ‘You seem unsure whether you [now] have the impression that the 
music is probably/maybe/certainly sad/emotionally expressive/emotion-
ally ambiguous’ (‘now’ is added because one may be unable to exactly 
remember earlier impressions). To use another example, one would prob-
ably not say, ‘You seem to be unsure whether you are unsure about the 
emotional character of the piece’.
Some persons may also be led to imagine a ‘musical persona’, i.e., a 
fictitious mind or person who experiences the emotion identified by the 
listener, while others may not; this may depend on the work.15 Possibly, 
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a solo voice of any instrument is more readily associated with a person 
than a tutti and fortissimo that may be rather imagined as some imper-
sonal force or architecture that is also perhaps associated with some emo-
tion. This imagination can be assumed to underlie the same principle of 
phenomenal transparency and non-falsifiability as the ascription of an 
emotion as such.
It is evident that not every possible aspect of sadness can be found or 
represented by analogy or symbolism in a piece of music. Arousal, move-
ment and valence are most easily represented, while the possible causes 
or antecedents and cognitive contents of sadness can hardly be conveyed 
without additional programmatic statements or titles. This explains why 
some authors have interpreted emotions expressed (and also caused) by 
music, or ascribed to music, as pseudo-emotions or otherwise ‘unreal’, 
‘incomplete’ or ‘etiolated’.16 I do not consider this distinction between 
real and unreal emotions all that helpful; all emotions ascribed to objects 
other than humans are ‘pseudo-emotions’ and all outer signs of emotions 
displayed by humans can obfuscate their real feelings. Emotions could 
be characterized as unreal if someone is mistaken about the cognitive ap-
praisal of certain facts, or upset by certain fictional representations, and 
so on. Unless the concept of the ‘realness’ of an emotion is clarified, it is 
not very informative to use this term.
With the different degrees of relationship between the appearance of 
a phenomenon described as ‘sad’ and the appearance or sensations of a 
real person feeling sadness, statements on the ‘sadness’ of the phenom-
enon can also be called either figurative or literal speech (or maybe some-
thing on a continuum between).17 Today, and in western cultures in par-
ticular, many persons tend to assume an intimate and direct relationship 
between music and emotion, and they would readily apply emotional la-
bels to it. This could explain why some deny that using emotional terms 
to describe music is metaphorical or metonymical speech, while others 
strongly defend this thesis. Consequently, a respondent may not only dis-
agree as to the variety of emotion (e.g., calm instead of sad), but also reply
  •  that this particular piece, or any piece at all, does not really leave 
in her (personally) an impression of real emotionality, or
  •  that this piece, or any piece, does not really leave such an impres-
sion in anyone, and that such an ‘impressionist’ description of 
this or of any music is nonsense, fictitious, metaphorical, or a 




Assuming that both interlocutors accept the idea that music can be 
characterized in emotional terms (being/sounding/appearing [to be] sad), 
based on such cues as described above, different persons may come to 
different conclusions as to how some music sounds emotionally.
As the range of components of an emotion is not completely present 
or represented in a specific piece or passage of music, an emotional im-
pression can be ambiguous, and may somehow seem ‘incomplete’.18 This 
is perhaps another reason why some have described emotions in music 
as, for example, ‘not full-fledged’ or as pseudo-emotions. However, for 
a given set of components, there is often one prototypical emotion that 
may differ according to personal dispositions but that is most readily rec-
ognized in the music. In such cases the listener would not call his impres-
sion ‘incomplete’, but would say rather that he really hears this emotion 
(that is readily recognized, but possibly ‘incomplete’ or ambiguous from 
an analytical perspective) as such in the music and that when he says 
that he does so, his statement is true. For example, we may speak of sad-
ness in cases where low arousal and a negative valence are represented 
although there are many other emotional terms and schemata that match 
these criteria, and although the cognitive content of sadness (a loss or ab-
sence of a beloved person or object, helplessness, social exclusion, and so 
on) is completely absent. We may as well speak of melancholy, lassitude, 
disheartenment, depressiveness, grief, sorrow, or tristesse, as these emo-
tions also match a less energetic and aversive state (although sometimes 
with some positive meta-emotional evaluations, such as the appreciation 
of melancholy). In some cases we may apply these terms to verbalize 
more differentiated impressions. The same probably holds for joy or joy-
fulness as prototypical in relation to similar emotions.
To acknowledge this probably inevitable ambiguity and incomplete-
ness of the range of emotions heard in music and, at the same time, to 
recognize the tendency to ascribe prototypical emotions, are perhaps 
more illuminative and precise than to state that some emotions are more 
easily recognized and expressed in music than others. At least, both of 
these views may be complementary.
1*. A respondent may also express his differing impression somewhat 
more tentatively, as a suggestion or guess: ‘Couldn’t this also be calm 
rather than sad?’ Due to the ‘incompleteness’ of emotion in music, it is 
possible for two listeners to at first disagree on the emotional character 
of a piece and for one of them to convince the other of his judgment (but 
not to ‘convince’ him in the sense of a logical argumentation), or for them 
to convince each another that their respective impressions are somehow 
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conceivable or justifiable. The hearer of a statement about an emotional 
expression can be guided or motivated to agree with an impression dif-
ferent from hers, i.e., to ‘hear the sadness’ instead of some other emo-
tion, by being referred to some traits of the music (i.e., to some alleged 
prototypical components), but she cannot be convinced in a strict sense 
– in the way that one can be convinced by some arguments that, e.g., the 
harmonic progression of a piece is the same as that of another work. In 
a certain way she can agree with the speaker that one can call the music 
sad, or even that it now seems completely evident to her that the music is 
indeed sad rather than anything else, or she may insist, ‘This music still 
sounds calm to me’.
Changes in one’s impressions – in particular, changes influenced by 
following a hint given by others or by concentrating on certain features 
of the music – can be subsumed under the concept of cognitive decen-
tration: the ability or mental operation by which one can perceive and 
consider a phenomenon from more than one perspective and with regard 
to different sets of properties or with more than one conceptual scheme, 
to interpret it as something or something else, and to switch more or less 
deliberately between the perspectives as one’s attention is directed will-
ingly or unwillingly to different cues that suggest their adoption or their 
coordination and integration.19 Compare this to the drawing of the duck-
rabbit, an ambiguous figure in which we switch between seeing a rabbit 
and a duck.20 Like the contemplator of that drawing, we hesitate between 
the language of the description of immediate perceptions, of identifica-
tion and certainty (this is a rabbit/an image of a rabbit, we see a rabbit, or 
it is sad music, it sounds sad), the language of ‘objective’ description (this 
drawing is made in such and such way that makes us see …, the music has 
properties that lead us to the impression of sadness) – two levels of de-
scriptive speech – and the language of subjectivity, interpretation, differ-
ence, intentionality, mere appearance, even illusion (we only see this as…/
this can be seen both as…[depending on…]; the music seems sad [to me, 
personally], we can try to hear it as sad and calm, I cannot hear it as sad 
[even if I try], and so forth). Thus, despite the phenomenal transparency of 
the impression under discussion, we can first recognize one emotion and 
regard this judgment as perfectly clear and immediately given (and thus 
make true statements about this impression), and then be lead to regard 
another impression as equally or more plausible and directly evident, in 
consequence of the utterances of others, the deliberate attempt to con-
sider possible alternatives, or other means (and make equally true state-
ments about this new impression). Furthermore, an existing impression 
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can become clearer and more perspicuous if the listener pays attention to 
a work’s formal characteristics. But these attempts may fail, so one may 
say, ‘I still cannot hear the sadness that you say you can hear in this piece’. 
What we cannot do is try to hear what we already hear.
It is also possible to shift one’s attention away from the direct impres-
sion of emotionality and concentrate on the presence or absence of its 
components in a work (otherwise, the above-mentioned explanations or 
theories and the terminology of ‘unrealness’ and ‘incompleteness’ would 
not be possible) or on the range of features of the work that may be as-
sumed to cause the aspects of the impression by analogy, resemblance, 
and so forth, or on any other formal structures or properties of the work 
or the performance (e.g., by changing the mode of listening from ‘impres-
sionistic’ to ‘analytic’).
Consequently, as the present type of statement on impressions does 
not have a truth condition that is strictly related to external criteria, we 
may now turn to another criterion by which a statement on an impres-
sion can be questioned, namely sincerity.
2. A respondent may think that the speaker is insincere when utter-
ing a statement about his reputed impression. The respondent could say 
something like, ‘No, it does not sound sad to you’, but this seems quite 
unnatural. One would more likely answer that the speaker is only pre-
tending to be sensitive and boasting about his differentiated impressions 
to, say, ‘wow’ someone, while he is really completely unmusical and un-
empathic or unfamiliar with the style of the work. Hence, even though 
one cannot be mistaken about the emotional appearance or impression 
of a piece to oneself, one could well deceive others about the existence or 
the content of such an impression.
3. A respondent may think that every reasonable or experienced lis-
tener should come to another conclusion, one that is the same as his own 
impression. She might say, ‘The piece doesn’t sound sad, it is calm, pe-
riod!’ or some less apodictic answer that goes in the same direction. Here, 
the speaker’s force of judgment is questioned and the respondent holds 
the theory that the ‘right’ emotionality of a work can or will be ‘correctly’ 
grasped by all competent listeners in the same way without any room 
for personal impressions. A statement of the present type is true if all 
competent listeners have a recognizable impression and they all feel that 
it is adequately subsumed under what is habitually called ‘sadness’. Ac-
cording to this assumption, the statement, ‘The piece sounds sad’ only 
makes sense without adding ‘to me’, as the piece sounds sad to everyone, 
or should sound so. The respondent may, in some extreme cases, even 
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presume some distortion of perception or pathological sensation in the 
speaker. For example, if someone called the chorus in Beethoven’s 9th 
symphony ‘anxious’, the reaction may be to express doubts about the 
personality of the speaker.
Here, a statement on an impression may converge with a strictly de-
scriptive statement in the sense that, if everyone recognizes the same 
emotion, this can be attributed to the music in a very determinate way. 
Consequently, the respondent can regard an impression – even his own 
at an earlier point in time – as false in the sense that it is inadequate to 
the real character of the work. However, that impression itself, at the mo-
ment of its emergence and presence, is still phenomenally transparent: 
It is impossible to say that one wrongly thought that one considered the 
music as sad.
4. A respondent may think the speaker has used inadequate language. 
He may say something like, ‘No, “sad” is probably not the right word for 
what you want to say about this music’. Again, such an answer would 
probably not be reduced to the utterance, ‘No, it doesn’t [sound sad]!’ but 
again, there may be occasions where this is almost conceivable. For ex-
ample, if someone said, ‘This music sounds schadenfroh’ (probably be-
ing unaware of the meaning of this loanword), one could answer: ‘No, it 
certainly doesn’t’. The speaker is neither mistaken about his impression 
(which, again, we have argued that he cannot be) or the possibility of an 
impression, nor does he try to deceive someone, but he is mistaken about 
the conventional and understandable use of words for emotions and 
their rules of application to perceptible phenomena. He has not learned 
them, or the respective language, correctly, and uses the wrong word for 
what he means in describing the emotion he hears in the music.
II
The second type of statement may be said to be about symbolism, such as, 
‘This motif, consisting of slow descending triplets, symbolizes/expresses/
refers to sad ness’. The concept of the symbol (or whatever the speaker 
may call the semiotic relation at hand) implied in such a statement may 
be either that of a purely conventional and arbitrary sign or of a relation-
ship of similitude (comparable to iconic signs) or analogy.
As a reaction to this type of statement, an interlocutor can question 
the presence or correct identification of the signifier: there are no triplets, 
there are many major chords, and so on. To settle their dispute, they can 




Another potential point of criticism with regard to this type of state-
ment is to doubt that the symbolic relationship is stated correctly. For 
example, one may argue that triplets usually do not symbolize sadness. 
This kind of disagreement is cleared up with more difficulty, but the 
disputants may either refer to a larger body of musical pieces with their 
respective interpretations, information on musical conventions, styles of 
composition, and so forth, or they may try to make the formal resem-
blance more evident if they believe that this type of symbolism is at 
hand.
Still another reaction is to doubt that the music symbolizes anything 
at all, either in general or with regard to the specific piece – the position 
generally known as formalism.21
In sum, this type of statement is true if the elements or structures of a 
piece of music are, by some convention, similitude or analogy, related to 
an emotion, depending on the correct identification of the rule of sym-
bolization.
If a speaker claims that the symbols he (in his mind, correctly) identi-
fies are the cause, or as he may see it, the reason or motivation for his 
impression of sadness, he may identify a certain convergence between 
the two types of statements. He may link them by pointing to his faculty 
of musical judgment and possibly questioning that of others: He is able to 
intuitively grasp the emotional symbolism of the piece and his mode of 
listening is holistic, as analytic and intuitive judgments converge. How-
ever, this does not prevent others from holding that the music sounds dif-
ferent to them, e.g., calm instead of sad, even if they agree that the formal 
characteristics are present, or even if they concede that these features 
conventionally express sadness, but not in the present case. Thus, their 
personal impression may or may not be overruled by formal analysis.
Thus, the second type of statement is about semiotic relationships and 
symbolic conventions or ‘iconic’ symbols. This type can only be reduced 
to the first type if one holds a theory of symbolization that equates signi-
fication with the intended or quasi-universal arousal of impressions (i.e., 
‘a means b if a evokes [the impression/feeling/idea, etc. of] b’), unlike a 
theory that, e.g., defines symbolization as a recognizable rule-governed 
relationship of reference.
III
The third type of statement is about expression, symptoms, indications or 
intentions. For example, someone may claim, ‘In the second movement of 
the n-th symphony the composer expresses his unrequited love to X’ (1); 
Types of Statements on Emotion in Music
77
‘In this movement, the composer wants to explore the shades of sadness’ 
(2) – a statement about an intention; or ‘the composition is an emblematic 
expression of the fin-de-siècle sentiment of melancholy’ (3) – a statement 
about the music as an indication or a symptom, or an unconscious ex-
pression of an emotion. 
This type of statement involves the postulate of psychological (or bio-
graphical, or sociological, or some other type of) facts or mental states 
involving emotions and being external to the work or musical event it-
self; also, in particular, it involves an inference. According to different 
theories held by the speaker, which may not be mutually exclusive, music 
may directly express real emotions experienced by the composer, convey 
some emotions unconsciously, or be about emotions, i.e., characterize 
them in terms of typical and non-typical but possible developments over 
a period of time, their dynamic qualities, combinations of emotions to be 
found in two persons being confronted with each other, and so forth.22
Possible reactions to these types of statement include doubt as to the 
correctness of the inference with regard to its content (i.e., as in the previ-
ous cases, the variety of emotion), and to the underlying theory of expres-
siveness in general. A respondent can even hold that music is not suitable 
to express emotion, that composers in general do not aim at the expres-
sion of emotions, that one cannot make inferences as to their emotions or 
some general sentimental atmosphere, situation, or zeitgeist from their 
music, and so forth. This position parallels those reactions described in 
the case of the previous types of statements where the respondent denies 
that music has anything to do with emotions at all, or that, at least, the re-
lationship is not of the kind implied in the respective type of statement. 
Thus the present type of statement is true if the right inferences are made 
(using adequate rules that link musical forms to states in the composer 
or his environment).
Statements on impressions and expression (and possibly on symbol-
ism) converge if one believes he has intuitively comprehended the com-
poser’s intention, emotional state or other circumstances, and correctly 
assumed a causal relationship between the way the emotion is expressed 
in the piece and one’s impression: The composer was sad, he used such 
and such a form to symbolize this, and the listener immediately identi-
fied this feeling, calling the piece sad.
If the speaker holds the theory that emotion is expressed in music 
if and only if a composer intentionally and knowingly encodes distinct 
emotions (his own, or the concept of the emotion as such) into clear-cut 
formal structures, statements of the present type either converge with 
Benjamin Krämer
78
those of the second, i.e., with statements about symbolism, as in the cases 
of (1) and (2), or they are nonsensical, as in the case of (3).
IV
After considering three types of statements with their referential and 
predicative aspects, their criteria of validity, and some possibilities to re-
fute them, I will conclude by revisiting the question of what the purpose 
– the illocutionary and perlocutionary function – of such statements is. 
We have already seen that statements of the first, the ‘impressionistic’ 
type can be interpreted as expressive (of the speaker’s impression) or as 
descriptive (of the work’s appearance, or of the fact that it causes some 
impression or illusion). The strictly expressive function of such state-
ments may be to voice one’s experiences when listening to music and to 
share or compare them with that of others. This can serve to strengthen 
a sense of community or have a distinctive function with regard to musi-
cal, emotional and linguistic competence, in particular when it comes to 
‘right’ and ‘wrong’ impressions and the use of differentiated emotional 
terms. Noting the emotional character of a piece can also serve as a start-
ing point to a more structural analysis (e.g., asking what it is that makes 
the music sound sad).
Adding statements of the second, semiotic type can be seen as an at-
tempt towards a more holistic appreciation of the work and to overcome 
merely subjective impressions, if one holds the theory that this is possi-
ble. Statements on symbolism may also serve as justifications or motives 
to adopt a certain perspective with regard to impressions or appearance 
(cf. above on cognitive decentration).
The second type can also be the basis for generalizations as to the 
form of music in general, or of some style or genre, and its emotional 
idioms: What does it mean, in general, to use a certain structure? How is 
it used and which emotions does it refer to (which, according to a theory 
of meaning as use, amounts to the same)?
If someone announces that she will attempt to give a ‘hermeneutic 
analysis’ or ‘interpretation’ of a musical work, she may grosso modo be ex-
pected, among other things, to utter statements of the second or third type 
(dealing with symbolism and expression), or both, depending on the un-
derstanding of the method. Statements on the impressions of the speaker 
or of others will be considered mostly irrelevant as strict arguments for a 
hermeneutic theory, although they may fulfill different illustrative, heu-
ristic or informative functions in analyses of musical works. Sometimes 
they also occur as more or less disguised statements of another type: ‘This 
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passage sounds/is sad’, which then means that it expresses sadness, or that 
its structure refers to sadness. Statements of the second and third type are 
also sometimes driven by interest in the composer rather than in a work: 
his style, his personality, his method of composing, or his conception of 
a faithful performance, for example, or in some group of composers, a 
school or a stylistic movement. Finally, all three kinds of statements can be 
used to reflect upon performances (one’s own or others) and the relation-
ship between the emotions of performers and those emotions ‘in’ the work 
(in the above-mentioned different senses).
Statements of the third, inferential type, could also be intended as an 
attempt of some kind of reductionism – a work is only a symptom of x 
– which is sometimes also meant as a form of criticism: The work is not 
‘pure’, its aesthetic is not disinterested, its production is driven by ephem-
eral affects or sentimental fashions, and so forth. Of course, the alterna-
tive of an anti-reductionist message is also possible: the work is more 
than a symptom of x, it is the product of an independent genius with 
his particular emotional experiences, a work that sublimates its affective 
material, and so on. Both of these lines of interpretation can be refuted as 
the fallacy of inferring a work’s aesthetic value from the circumstances 
of its production. However, the different types of statements also enter 
into the evaluation of a work in other regards, e.g., if the speaker judges 
the appropriateness and originality or the effectiveness with which an 
emotional impression is created in the listener.
Considering the pragmatic aspect of the types of statements under 
analysis, we may finally note that some persons rarely talk about emo-
tions, in particular with regard to music (whether they listen to it in a 
sentimental mode or not), and that to some persons, the above statements 
may indicate an overestimation of the relationship between music and 
emotion, an inflationary use of emotional terms in the analysis and criti-
cism of music and everyday talk about it, and a loss of alternative aes-
thetic and analytic approaches. Both groups may then hold the view that 
those statements are, if not senseless, then useless or, to some extent, 
superfluous.
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